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Chapter I: Introduction

The rise of China could have an enormous impact on the security of the U.S. and East
Asian states, but it is unclear how policymakers should respond. The complexity and importance
of China’s rise has generated a large volume of scholarship including explanations, predictions,
and policy prescriptions. What it has not produced much of is consensus. The events of the last
fifteen years have not definitively confirmed or invalidated different understandings, and the
debates of today mimic those of the past. While much scholarship may be interesting from a
theoretical standpoint, the amount of definitive theoretical knowledge available from a
policymaker’s point of view is fairly low.
I contend that the relative lack of knowledge useful for policy is a result of a lack of
substantive engagement of contextual analyses at a theoretical level. Analysts sometimes
entertain different theoretical positions, but often decisively choose a favored position somewhat
arbitrarily, or by claiming that the favored theory better describes a particular set of evidence.
While this approach is useful for a policymaker sharing this theoretical approach, it does little to
counter competing policy prescriptions.
Coherent analysis from one theoretical position can often coexist with analysis from
another position for two main reasons. First, the meanings of facts are disputed. For example,
some find that the lack of large-scale Chinese militarization is evidence that a wealthy China will
be a status quo power, and will not generate security problems. For others, the lack of
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militarization is only an effective buildup of latent power that will inevitably lead to
militarization when China is wealthier. Second, the standards for relevant evidence vary across
theoretical positions. Idealists claim that ideas are a relevant (if not the only) variable for
analysis, while materialists reject their importance. The result is that analyses of the same issue,
the security implications of China’s rise, are competitive only in their outcomes, such as
predictions and policy prescriptions, not in their substance. The only way to resolve these
disputes is at the theoretical level, because the claims are only effectively competing at the
theoretical level.
For scholars, leaving theoretical debates to theorists may be preferable, because it enables
applied and empirical work. Scholars can assume a theoretical position and work within that
position, knowing that the relevance of their work is contingent on a side in an unresolved
theoretical debate. This contingency, however, can pose a serious problem for policymakers.
Policymakers are faced with contradictory policy prescriptions that require resolution at a
complex theoretical level, often involving literature found in a different set of publications.
Consequently, policymakers have two options. First, they can take a position in a
theoretical debate and focus on specific analysis from that position. Decisively theoretical
foreign policies are not unheard of, such as Nixon and Kissinger’s realism and the Bush
administration’s neoconservativism linked to Project for a New American Century. Taking sides
in a theoretical debate is useful for policymakers since it provides a clear guide to policy, but it
can also lead to substantial problems if the theory itself is poor. For example, optimistic
expectations of the Iraq War were apparently based in part on a particularly broad version of
democratic peace theory, which is controversial largely because of its questionable methodology
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(a fairly technical concern).1 Policymakers may be generally aware of theoretical debates and
may prefer a particular side, but fully understanding and correctly using theory takes a level of
technical expertise often at odds with the skills and concerns of the policymaker.
Second, policymakers can avoid explicitly theoretical positions. Several works have
identified a tendency among policymakers to reject the usefulness of theory in practice.2
Rejecting theory altogether is not possible. Policymakers act as they do because they expect
certain outcomes from their actions, and the expectation and the value of the outcome result from
some understanding about the nature of international politics. Policymakers who reject the
usefulness of theory are actually taking theoretical positions, although they may be subconscious
and inconsistent. In his study of the theory-policy relationship, Alexander George found that
although policymakers generally disliked “theory,” they recognized the importance of “generic
knowledge.”3 The two terms are functionally very similar (if not identical), yet the negative
connotation of “theory” among policymakers limits careful and systematic examination of this
“generic knowledge.” This approach may also lead to poor policy, because the implicit
theoretical positions may be inconsistent with each other, creating an incoherent foreign policy,
or the theoretical assumptions themselves may be of poor quality. Closed to explicit reflection
on the role of theory in analysis and practice, the use of theoretical knowledge and theory-laden
contextual analyses is minimal.

1

John M. Owen IV, “Iraq and the Democratic Peace: Who says Democracies Don’t Fight?” review of Electing to
Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6
(November-December 2005): 122-127.
2
For example: Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington: U.S.
Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Joseph Lepgold and Miroslave Nincic, ed., Being Useful: Policy Relevance and
International Relations Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav
Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance (New York:
Columbia UP, 2001).
3
Alexander George, xviii-xix.
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This paper demonstrates the importance of this general theory-practice problem in the
context of American China policy, and attempts to find a solution. The particular concern is
extremely pessimistic views of China, especially John Mearsheimer’s offensive realist
assessment, because these views prescribe competitive policies that would likely lead to
undesirable outcomes. Of course, these “China threat” theories consider the outcomes of
competitive policies to be preferable to the predicted outcomes of (initially) non-competitive
policies. Yet the need for complete assessment, including an assessment at the theoretical level,
is prudent before competitive policies are adopted.

Organization
Chapter II explains the pessimistic view of China’s rise from Mearsheimer’s offensive
realist perspective. I give a brief overview of the realist tradition from which offensive realism
originates. In particular, I focus on Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism because Mearsheimer’s
theory shares most of its epistemic status with Waltz’s theory. I indicate the relevant differences
between Waltz’s realism and offensive realism, most notably in the expected behavior of states
(power maximizing as opposed to balance-seeking). Lastly, I demonstrate how Mearsheimer has
applied his theory to the rise of China, and highlight his prescriptions for American
policymakers.
Chapter III explains the difficulty of policymakers using an offensive realist response to
the rise of China. It identifies two specific problems with offensive realism in this case. First,
offensive realism’s policy prescriptions will lead to only marginally better outcomes in the longterm, while they will lead to suboptimal outcomes in the short-term. Second, offensive realist
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claims about the rise of China conflict with claims from other theoretical positions, and these
conflicts can only be resolved with great sensitivity toward theoretical debates. The conclusion
is not that offensive realism ought to be abandoned outright, since its claims are important and
possibly true, but that greater theoretical sensitivity from a policymaker’s standpoint must be
employed to craft optimal policy.
Chapter IV evaluates several of the major applications of theory to the rise of China,
highlighting some of the major debates. The theoretical applications are evaluated on their
suitability to the context and their utility in policymaking. The chapter’s organization is
necessarily somewhat arbitrary, since different theoretical positions are nuanced and not easily
grouped, yet it begins with positions closer to offensive realism and moves outward. I find that
although offensive realism’s “China threat” interpretation cannot be definitively disproved, other
theoretical positions, especially constructivist positions, can more accurately analyze the rise of
China.
Chapter V then concludes by assessing the proper positions for a policymaker. My
argument is that although it is necessary to attempt to resolve the theoretical debate,
policymakers cannot expect to find a “correct” theoretical position and proper subsequent
contextual application. Instead, they must acknowledge some theoretical uncertainty and take
positions based on the two factors of relative accuracy of analysis and expected payoff/risk from
any particular prescription. In the case of the rise of China, I argue that American policymakers
should not pursue the “containment” strategy recommended by offensive realism because of both
weaknesses in offensive realist analysis in this context, and because the expected payoff of the
strategy is low relative to other strategies.

9

Chapter II: Offensive Realism and the “China Threat”

There are many reasons why people believe that China is a threat, and some of these
reasons are shallow and unsophisticated. For example, some American commentators on the
Christian- or far-right seem to have a China threat theory based on China’s
theological/ideological status. As one such Internet-based publication articulates, “China has
been a communist country for 60 years. Not only is Marxist philosophy at odds with the
American way of life, Marxism is hostile toward every other way of life than its own.”4 It is
fairly easy to argue against this particular theory by proving that the Chinese state no longer
espouses a Marxist ideology, or by proving that ideology is not a good predictor of foreign
policy. Attempting to address every different reason, however, would be an interminable task.
My starting point is the “China threat” of offensive realism, as portrayed in
Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.5 I pick this threat articulation for three
admittedly somewhat subjective reasons. First, it is arguably the most popular and visible China
threat theory, aided by Mearsheimer’s popularity and his frequent publishing on the matter.
Second, offensive realism portrays the “threat” in some of the most pessimistic terms, both in
terms of the degree of conflict and the certainty of it occurring, and Mearsheimer has been fairly
specific in the theory’s application in this manner. Lastly, offensive realism claims the threat on
the basis of its relation to a more general theory of international politics, not a reductionist
4

Bob Ellis, “Communist China: An Increasingly Imperialistic Threat,” Dakota Voice, 3 June 2010,
http://www.dakotavoice.com/2010/06/communist-china-an-increasingly-imperialistic-threat/ (Accessed April 17,
2011).
5
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
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analysis of the Chinese case specifically. This allows for the testing of theories using China as a
case study, enabling conclusions about the relative merits of theories as well as the status of the
“China threat.” Of course not all other IR theoretical positions are completely optimistic about
the rise of China. I also consider several other positions that espouse some concern, but none are
as clear in their pessimism as offensive realism.

Realism
Realism is not a theory; it is a paradigm or a philosophical position.6 Realist theories
often disagree on foundational elements, yet this does not invalidate realism as an approach to
international politics because realism itself is non-falsifiable.7 Despite some disputes, realism
gains some coherence as a paradigm from shared assumptions, methods, and conclusions. Some
theories have an ambiguous relationship to realism, or may count as realist theories in certain
contexts but not others. Realist theories in a strict sense, theories that are unquestionably realist,
have at least four commonalities. First, realism is state-centric. The state is both the actor in
international politics and the referent for all matters of security. In other words, states are both
those affecting international politics, and those (relevantly) affected by international politics.8
Realists disagree about what causes states to act in certain ways, but that states are the only
relevant actors is not seriously contested.9 Second, realism claims that states exist in anarchy.
There is no power that governs the relations among states, meaning that states have to rely on
6

Yuan-Kang Wang, “Offensive Realism and the Rise of China,” Issues and Studies 40, no. 1 (March 2004): 175.
Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4, (1997):
933.
8
Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 17.
9
Realism may be applicable to non-state actors in situations other than international politics if similar conditions are
met (anarchy, self-interested rational actors, etc.), but states are the relevant actor in international politics: Kenneth
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 121.
7
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“self-help” for protection and prosperity.10 While realism demonstrates that states have
strategies available to achieve some measure of security in anarchy, the ever-present danger
creates what Mearsheimer calls “a gloomy view of international relations.”11 While realist
theories generally accept this conclusion, they may disagree on the extent to which conflict and
violence can be managed. Third, realism focuses on relative power as the currency of
international politics. Given the anarchic system, the relationships between states are defined
primarily through the power differential of those states and other states relevant to the balance of
power.12 Realists may disagree about the definition of power, or whether political calculations
are based on power alone or on a different variable largely determined by power (such as Walt’s
“balance of threat” theory),13 but relative power is always central to a realist understanding of
international relations.
The realist paradigm must be embodied in theory for it to become a meaningful tool of
policy analysis. Realist theories can be divided into three main camps. A division can be made
based on the causes of state action in the international system, with the two main types being
classical realism and structural realism. Structural realism can be further divided between
defensive and offensive realism. I summarize several theories that meet these divisions below to
give a sense of the context of offensive realism and its “China threat.” The theories presented do
not account for all theories or theoretical stances under their general categories, but are central or
typical representations of them.
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Ibid., 111.
Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 17.
12
Ibid., 18.
13
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987), 22.
11
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Classical realism
Also known as “human nature realism,”14 classical realism posits that conflict between
states is primarily a product of the aggressiveness of human nature. Hans J. Morgenthau is the
canonical author of classical realism with his work Politics Among Nations, which was
influential after World War II.15 As Morgenthau argues, “political realism believes that politics,
like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”16
That nature in the international arena translates to a state’s “interest defined in terms of power.”17
In other words, states seek as much political power as possible because they are social
institutions, and therefore follow the drives of human nature. Given the premise that people (and
states) will experience a conflict of interest in their pursuit of power, the goal of politics is to
achieve “the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.”18 This “lesser evil” is
pursued through the balance of power, in which states try to maintain an existing equilibrium or
construct a new equilibrium.19

Structural realism and its defensive strains
Defensive realism is the original of the two main branches of structural realism (which is
also called “neorealism”). Structural realism is most directly an innovation of Kenneth Waltz in
his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, building on his 1954 book Man, the State, and

14

Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 19.
Ibid.
16
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, sixth edition, brief edition
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 4.
17
Ibid., 5.
18
Ibid., 4.
19
Ibid., 184.
15
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War.20 Waltz rejects other international political theories of the time, including classical realism,
primarily because of methodological concerns that he claims limit the utility of the theory.
Waltz consequently begins Theory of International Politics with an explanation of his concept of
a theory and its epistemic status. To some extent, Waltz seems rejects the objective status of
theory and reality with the limits he places on induction. While he does claim that induction can
objectively accumulate data and make causal claims between variables, induction alone cannot
explain anything. As Waltz puts it, “reality emerges from our selection and organization of
materials that are available in infinite quantity.”21 With respect to theory, “theories do construct
a reality, but no one can ever say that it is the reality.”22 By this it appears that Waltz means that
there is an objective reality (the reality), and theories can only echo images of it (a reality). This
image, the theoretical conception of reality, emerges from a “creative idea” of the theorist.23
Following the position of Karl Popper, Waltz argues that theory is then tested by rationally
(objectively) deducing hypotheses from the theory, and testing them against data. The theory
itself cannot be true or false (according to Waltz, this is the realm of law, the causal connection
between variables), but better or less able to explain the truth or falsity of deduced empirical
tests.24 These tests should use the scientific method, objectively collecting data and assessing it
in relation to expectations deduced from the theoretical understanding of the structure of reality.
The assumption seems to be that the theory and theorist are not part of reality (the reality), but

20

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State and War: a theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia UP, 1954).
Waltz, Theory, 5.
22
Ibid., 9.
23
Ibid., 11.
24
Ibid., 9.
21
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are able to stand back and objectively analyze it in the way that the natural sciences claim to
operate, using essentially the same methods (unity of science).25
Using this theoretical stance as a contrast, Waltz criticizes existing international relations
theories because they are reductionist, meaning that they cannot explain any given phenomena
without looking at the particulars of that given phenomena. Morgenthau, he argues, cannot
properly explain why the international system has a realist character, so he must attribute “causes
arbitrarily to the level of interacting units.”26 For a rigorous and useful social science, theory
must be able to explain recurring outcomes without relying on the character of the actors (in this
case states), especially since actors seem to vary and change considerably.27 Instead of
explanation at the level of states (based on the “human nature” of those controlling them),
explanation must originate at the level of the (anarchic) structure to be able to explain the actions
of the units of the system (states in this case) in a non-reductionist way. Hence Waltz’s embrace
of third-level, structural analysis, which enables the theorist to disregard the content of each
particular state, and instead explain and predict based on the behavior that the structure itself
requires (at least for continued existence of the unit). Structural realism, therefore, relies on
structure to explain recurrence in international politics despite different actors. The anarchic
system necessitates that states act to ensure their security through strategies of power. This
creates similar sorts of realist patterns observed by Morgenthau and previous realists, but the
explanation for why these patterns occur is different. This difference is not arbitrary because the
theoretical stance of structural realism supposedly allows more consistent and accurate
explanations and predictions.
25

Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1994), 123.
26
Waltz, Theory, 62.
27
Ibid., 63-66.
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Structural realism as a broad category only posits a cause for power competition, not
specific characteristics of that power competition, and indeed various classical realist and
structural realist analyses may seem very similar. Specific structural realist theories, however,
expound upon the manner in which the international structure influences state behavior.
Defensive realism is the first of such structural realist theories, promoted by Waltz and his
followers. Since states are motivated by security, they will not typically seek broadly
expansionary goals and will attempt to preserve the balance of power. Bandwagoning, where a
state allies with the stronger power, is unlikely to occur because the threat to security comes
from the stronger power. Should a state (or coalition) begin to create a power imbalance through
either its internal development (increasing domestic sources of power) or alliance-forming with
other states, the expected behavior of other states is to balance against the rising power by
forming a counter-coalition and increasing domestic sources of power. Importantly, this also
means that achieving a balance of power is the goal of states, not maximization of power.
Bandwagoning and other power-seeking policies increase instability, creating an incentive for
preventive war, and are therefore largely inconsistent with a goal of security. Of course states
will seek power, but only for the ends of security through the balance of power, not as an ends in
itself.28

Offensive realism
Offensive realism, a creation of John Mearsheimer, takes the structural formulation from
Waltz and uses it to argue for a different expectation of state behavior and international

28

Ibid., 126.
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outcomes. While defensive realism claim that states only pursue power to the extent that it
creates a balance, offensive realism claims that the state’s appetite for power is insatiable. As
Mearsheimer puts it, “A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.”29 In the
offensive realist understanding, states are also motivated by security, but have little reason to
believe that maintaining the balance of power alone will provide this. Because states have the
ability to attack each other, and there is no way to ensure benign intention of other states, states
are potential dangers to each other. The only way for a state to maximize its chance of survival
(Mearsheimer tends to use “survival” instead of “security”) is to maximize its power because a
powerful state is less likely to be attacked and more likely to win if attacked.30
Moreover, there is no apparent limit to how much power, either relative or absolute, is
sufficient to ensure security, because it is never clear how much relative power is necessary for
security. Additionally, relative power changes, meaning that states ought to constantly maximize
their power to guarantee their security in the long-term. A state can only be truly secure,
therefore, in a position of unchallenged hegemony, so hegemony is the goal of all states. The
consequence, as Mearsheimer puts it, is that “great powers have aggressive intentions,” because
they constantly try to increase their power at the expense of others.31
Great powers are not constantly at war, of course, so there are some limits to the
aggression of states, but these limits are imperfect. A state is only likely to start a war when it
makes the calculation that its relative power will be increased at the conclusion of the conflict. If
there were reason to believe that a conflict will result in either a loss or a Pyrrhic victory for a

29

Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 21.
Ibid., 33.
31
Ibid., 34.
30
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state, the state would rationally forgo conflict initiation.32 Yet the information available to
decision-makers is deficient, so great powers may miscalculate and initiate conflicts that they
end up losing.33 Mearsheimer also agrees that balancing behavior, defensive realism’s potential
guarantor of security and stability, sometimes occurs. Yet this too is only a mitigating factor. As
even defensive realists would concede, a balance of power is no guarantee of conflict prevention
when information is imperfect and miscalculation possible. Decision-makers could mistakenly
see an opportunity to enhance the power of their state through aggression when no such
opportunity exists, creating disastrous results. Since offensive realism argues that states seek
power maximization instead of a balance of power, a perceived imbalance will be met with
aggression rather than counter-balancing or non-action (on the part of the greater power).
Moreover, Mearsheimer contests that balancing is the most alluring strategy for states faced with
a rising power, arguing instead that “buck-passing” is more likely. “A buck-passer,” according
to Mearsheimer, “attempts to get another state to bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting
an aggressor, while it remains on the sidelines.”34 Buck-passing is an attractive option for states
because deterrence and war are costly, but it is likely to check potential aggressors because the
state tasked with countering the aggressor might fail. This likelihood of imbalance is increased
when multiple states are trying to buck-pass, creating confusion and uncertainty that is likely to
hinder effective balancing behavior.35
Offensive realism, therefore, paints the darkest picture of a rising power. A rising power
will not simply wish to create a new, stable balance of power somewhat more in its favor.
Instead, it will actively seek to accumulate as much power as possible at the expense of potential
32

Ibid., 37.
Ibid., 38.
34
Ibid., 157-158.
35
Ibid., 161.
33
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rivals. Other great powers will see the potential for a peer challenger or even a hegemon, and
will wish to halt the rising power while they still have the chance. Great power conflict in these
situations is likely, and at the very least one would expect the undesirable results associated with
significant power competition, such as proxy wars, arms races, and economic losses. For
Mearsheimer and other offensive realists, China currently fits this role as the dangerous rising
power.

Offensive realism and the “China threat”
To apply the universal claims (theoretical claims) of offensive realism to the particular
case of the rise of China, Mearsheimer first clarifies his understanding of the existing balance of
power. The United States is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but not a global
hegemon. Mearsheimer claims that Germany could also become a potential regional hegemon in
Europe if the U.S. removes its security presence from Europe, forcing Germany to secure itself.36
For now, however, Germany remains under the security umbrella of the U.S., and the biggest
potential for great power rivalry is in East Asia. The U.S. remains a strong force in East Asia,
but it is not hegemonic. Russia and China are the other two poles in the multipolar system, and
both qualify as great powers because of “nuclear arsenals, the capability to contest and probably
thwart a U.S. invasion of their homeland, and limited power-projection capability.”37 Japan is
also of great importance due to its wealth, but it is dismissed as a possible regional hegemon
because of its relatively small population. Russia is dismissed for the same reason, as well as its

36
37

Ibid., 394.
Ibid., 381.
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much weaker economy and need to secure its non-Asian borders.38 China, according to
Mearsheimer, is the only potential hegemon.
Writing in 2001, Mearsheimer claimed that the power dynamic could take basically two
routes depending on Chinese economic growth. At the time, the Japanese economy was still
substantially larger than the Chinese economy, so not wanting to make economic predictions,
Mearsheimer acknowledged that Chinese economic growth might slow substantially. Were this
to have happened, the U.S. would probably reduce its military presence in East Asia, creating a
multipolarity of China, Japan, and Russia, with no country able to claim hegemony. While this
would be potentially unstable, the possibility for a peaceful balance of power would remain.39
The criterion set for this first route was that Japan would have to remain the largest economy in
the region, but China passed Japan in 2010 and it does not appear that Japan will make up the
difference any time soon.40
The other route is that China’s economy continues to grow causing China to become by
far the most powerful state in the region. Even if all other states in the region ally in an attempt
to balance China (not an easy task since buck-passing may be tempting), they will likely not be
able to equal the vast power of China given its enormous population and economy.41 China will
try to maximize its power like any state, so it will take advantage of its demographic and
economic advantages and militarize in a bid for regional hegemony.

38

Ibid., 397.
Ibid., 399.
40
Clifford Coonan, “China overtakes Japan to become second largest economy in the world,” The Irish Times, 17
August 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2010/0817/1224276972874.html (accessed April 17,
2011).
41
Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 400.
39

20

Regional hegemony in this case could take the form of either conquest similar to Japan’s
pre-WWII attempt, or the form of dominance through threat, as the U.S. has been able to control
the behavior of states in the Western Hemisphere. Mearsheimer thinks that the latter is more
likely, but acknowledges that both are possible.42 Intense, unbalanced power competition will
occur, with great power war a strong possibility. Other states in the region will try to stop
Chinese hegemony, tempting preventive war. The existence of several potential flashpoints such
as Taiwan, North Korea, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands will make conflict initiation easier.
Tensions will escalate with the U.S., since China will have to push the U.S. out of East Asia to
achieve hegemony.43 The U.S. will also strongly oppose the possibility of a peer competitor in a
Chinese regional hegemon, especially because China’s economy and population could possibly
become much more powerful than any rival faced in the 20th century.44 The U.S. will treat China
like it did the Soviet Union in the Cold War, but of course there is no guarantee that the U.S. and
China will not directly engage in war.45 In fact, Mearsheimer thinks that war is more likely
because geographic differences put less at stake for both sides than would have a European
conflict in the Cold War. Reducing the cost of war increases the chance that one side will see
war as a rational choice, an acceptable risk.46
Can anything be done to avoid this terrible fate? Mearsheimer does not think so: “The
picture I have painted of what is likely to happen if China continues its rise is not a pretty one. I
actually find it categorically depressing and wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about

42

John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105 (April 2006): 163.
John J. Mearsheimer, “Trouble brewing in the ‘hood,’” The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 2010,
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/contributors/trouble-brewing-in-the-hood-20100802-113ab.html (accessed April
17, 2011).
44
Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 401.
45
John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 390.
46
Ibid., 392.
43
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the future.”47 This sense of fatalistic determinism is echoed in the scarcity of policy advice
Mearsheimer provides. As far as is discernable, he has suggested only two possible policy
modifications, both in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics in 2001. First, he argues that the
U.S. (and presumably other states facing a threat from China) should switch to a policy of
containment in place of engagement. Engagement in whatever form, be it through trade,
international organizations, or democracy promotion, will not mitigate China’s ambitions and
can only enhance China’s power. Particularly, the U.S. should try to harm China’s economy to
reduce (or at least slow the growth of) its major source of power.48 He does not propose any
specific policies for how the U.S. could do this, and it would likely be difficult without harming
the American economy substantially. Second, he implies that the U.S. should consider
withdrawing its forces from East Asia. The U.S. could return to its classic role as an offshore
balancer, and only intervene when necessary. Withdrawal would prevent regional allies from
buck-passing, requiring them to build up their own deterrent. Japan in particular would
substantially increase its military might. The U.S. could possibly allow other states to do the all
of the fighting should a conflict occur, although Mearsheimer seems skeptical that this would be
sufficient. At the very least, the U.S. could involve itself later in a war so that it suffers less and
emerges in a better position. Mearsheimer does acknowledge that removing American forces
may actually increase the likelihood of war because of its destabilizing effect, but claims that the
risk is worthwhile from an American perspective.49 Presumably his policy advice for other
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countries in the region would be the opposite: try to keep a strong American military presence in
the region.
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Chapter III: Evaluating Applied Theory

For a claim about the future of security in East Asia, Mearsheimer says very little about
East Asian security of the present. He makes general observations about the relative powers of
states in the region, but says virtually nothing specific about history, regime types, diplomatic
signals, existing tactical capabilities, security-related incidents, or size or growth of defense
budgets. This is not to say that offensive realism is incompatible with an explanation of the
present in East Asia or that offensive realism cannot itself explain the present, although some
scholars do make this claim.50 Regardless, the point is that data not required by the causal
mechanism of offensive realism is considered irrelevant and possibly misleading. Theory,
following the role specified by Waltz, is a way of making sense of otherwise senseless data.
Infinite data necessitates simplification in theory, including variable isolation.51 Simplification
means that occasionally hypotheses deduced from theory (such as predictions) will be incorrect
because other variables that are usually negligible were important in a particular case for some
reason. Even though theories are not perfect, they are still required to understand anything.
Theories ought to be judged on their utility, which includes their ability to deduce accurate
hypotheses.52
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Mearsheimer therefore, picks out the important systemic variable, the distribution of
power (and probably geography, although Mearsheimer is somewhat vague on geography’s
role), and provides a clear, empirically backed description (in this case primarily of the
predictive type) and consequent prescription.53 Of course, Mearsheimer’s analysis is contingent
on the distribution of power changing as predicted, meaning that China’s rise must not come to
an end. Some have criticized Mearsheimer for not sufficiently accounting for the possibility of
future economic problems in China, arguing that the enormous “rise” predicted by Mearsheimer
and others fearful of China will likely not materialize, voiding pessimistic predictions.54 As
mentioned earlier, Mearsheimer is not exacting in the necessary distribution of power to cause
the instability necessary to meet his prediction, but China’s current economic status seems to
have met his criterion. I also assume that China’s GNP will continue to rise at a fairly rapid rate
over the next few decades, eventually passing that of the United States, although the timeline is
necessarily somewhat unclear. This assumption could be wrong, and some scholars clearly think
that China’s long-term growth is overhyped.55 At the very least, uncertainty inherent in
economic forecasts ought bring a similar level of uncertainty to the predictions of offensive
realism.
Even with this caveat in mind, Mearsheimer recognizes that he may be theoretically
wrong so he “should therefore proceed with humility, tak[ing] care not to exhibit unwarranted
confidence.” Nevertheless, the claimed success rate of his theory (he finds only one anomaly)
certainly demonstrates at least some (perhaps warranted) confidence. Moreover, Mearsheimer
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argues that predictions are still important for theorists to “inform policy discourse,” indicating
enough confidence to desire that his policy prescriptions be followed.56 This goal is reflected in
his attempts to publicize his “China threat” claim outside of academia with public debates,
speeches to politicians, and newspaper op-eds.57
Yet if utility is the standard by which to judge theory, then offensive realism does not
seem to be very useful in the case of a rising China. Its prediction that East Asia will become the
site of the next “tragedy of great power politics” is disturbing. The best case would be a Cold
War-like scenario, which would likely include proxy wars, large economic costs, and widespread
fear. At worst, the region (or the entire world) will erupt in great power war, including possible
nuclear war. Policy choices will do little to avoid these catastrophes, since Mearsheimer thinks
that they are more determinate of who will suffer or a small change in the degree of suffering
instead of if suffering will happen at all. Offensive realism is therefore not very useful in
avoiding this tragedy.
Moreover, offensive realist policy prescriptions would seem to hasten the tragedy.
Without adopting a particular theoretical stance, it would seem reasonable to claim that a policy
of containment directed at China would have two results. First, containment would result in a
loss of absolute gains, at least in non-security measures. Even if it were possible for the U.S. and
other states to hamper China’s economic growth, it would come at the cost of the quality of life
in China and likely in other states too (such as in the case of sanctions, where the sanctioning
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state’s economy is also damaged). Second, containment would worsen the security dilemma and
other competition in the short-term. The idea of containment is that even if competition does not
exist at present or exists at a low level, it will necessarily exist in the future. It is therefore better
to initiate or amplify that competition now when the balance of power is more favorable to the
falling power. Yet initiating competitive behaviors hastens and ensures their existence. The
specific policies used in a containment strategy are open to debate within the offensive realist
paradigm, but further tension would seem to result from all of them. A 2005 article gives a sense
of the possible options including sanctions, bloc formation, further arming Taiwan, fomenting
ethnic uprising, or “harsher measures.”58 Consequently, following offensive realist prescriptions
reduces doubt of offensive realist predictions.
Offensive realism’s inutility in avoiding tragedy enhances the appeal of other, less
gloomy theories. Yet according to Waltz and Mearsheimer, the usefulness of a theory should be
judged by its explanatory power, not the normative appeal of its claimed outcomes.59 Realists
deride more rosy theories as “idealist” and unable to explain much of international politics.
Moreover, not only are idealist positions considered delusional, they are also considered
dangerous because they lead to poor policy choices. For example, one of the more famous and
disastrous cases of the failure of policy based on idealism was the inability of the League of
Nations to prevent several wars including World War II.60 In the case of Sino-American
relations, Mearsheimer claims that the U.S.’s policy of engagement with China is based on
liberal theories such as economic interdependence. However, these theories are weak in their
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explanatory power (according to realists), so they misrepresent the effect of a policy of
engagement. Instead, engagement will only worsen the outcomes of great power competition.61
Yet offensive realism is far from international relations dogma. A multitude of criticisms
are directed at either offensive realism specifically or at various assumptions that it shares with
other theories (e.g., comparative gains, systemic theory, or positivism). Likewise, a multitude of
competing theoretical positions claim to be better (on various criteria) than offensive realism and
its theoretical brethren. In fact, the “China threat” claim of offensive realism necessitates at least
implicitly taking a position on most of the major debates in IR theory. Definitively proving the
superiority of the offensive realist approach to the rise of China would therefore entail
definitively winning most of the major debates in IR theory. But “winning” is not practically
possible because of the enormous quantity of argument and data, and the continued existence of
some debates suggests that they may be conceptually irresolvable as well.
Such complex and deep divisions pose a significant problem for policymakers and other
actors concerned with affecting “the real world,” and may lead to an indifference to or
misunderstanding of theory.62 Yet these complex, technical debates are far from trivial to
policymaking. Sino-American policy today is no different, as competing theories suggest
different policies and expect radically different outcomes. Policymakers must use knowledge to
do their job, but what counts as relevant knowledge can be unclear.
The rest of this paper attempts to sort out the theory-policy problem in the context of the
rise of China. The next chapter reviews possible contributions of several theoretical positions to
understanding and acting on the rise of China. The review is necessarily incomplete, so the
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focus is on prominent and divisive views. The chapter should achieve three main goals. First, it
highlights the importance of apparently trivial theoretical issues in terms of policymaking,
specifically in the context of China. Second, it clarifies how different theories are applicable to
China. Third, it assesses the theories in terms of their usefulness for explanation and policy in
the context of China. The assessment of these theoretical applications is contrasted with
offensive realism’s application for comparative evaluation of their utility.
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Chapter IV: IR Theory and the Rise of China

Will Mearsheimer’s prediction come true? His confidence is clear in the bluntness of his
claim: “Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no.”63 Predictions of this certainty are not
commonly found in international relations, especially not in contexts of such complexity and
importance as the next few decades of East Asian security. Of course only time will tell, and
Mearsheimer himself admits that the nature of social science does not allow for perfect
predictive power.64 Yet one can still assess the strength of the claim in terms of both the
substance of the prediction and the ability of theories to make such predictions more generally.
This chapter makes that assessment, evaluating several other theoretical positions and the
strengths and weaknesses they have relative to offensive realism.
The organization of this chapter proceeds along the rough divisions of realist, liberal, and
sociological. Theoretical claims do not always fit neatly under these different labels, so grouping
risks essentializing a theoretical claim when it is actually nuanced. Theoretical claims under
these different headings can be quite diverse, resulting in very different applications to China’s
rise. Moreover, theoreticians from different paradigms often respond to (and sometimes
incorporate) innovations from different paradigms, meaning that development of different
paradigms cannot be easily broken into distinct paths of development amenable to groupings
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under a single heading. Nevertheless, the grouping is useful inasmuch as it allows for some
coherent distinction between different theoretical claims.

Realism
Realists as a whole probably have the most pessimistic view of China’s rise, but few
share the certainty and absolute pessimism of Mearsheimer. The primary dispute between
Mearsheimer and other realists is over the question of power maximization as a state goal, with
defensive realists arguing that power maximization is not (or should not be) a state goal, and
neoclassical realists arguing that power maximization is one of several possible state goals. I do
not directly address a possible classical realist analysis of the rise of China because classical
realism is rarely employed by theorists today, but much of the sentiment of classical realism is
preserved in neoclassical realism, which includes some classical realist variables in a structural
analysis. None of these positions seem to offer a prediction as rosy as those of some liberals, but
they are more guarded and nuanced in their analyses than offensive realism.

Waltz’s structural realism
The realism of Kenneth Waltz is theoretically similar to Mearsheimer’s, since offensive
realism is a modification of Waltz’s structural realism, yet the expected outcomes and prescribed
behaviors are strikingly different. Waltz’s realism has a “status quo bias” since there is little
incentive for states to try to revise the balance of power, leading to the expectation (or at least
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possibility) of a relatively peaceful world.65 Waltz and Mearsheimer agree that the anarchic
structure of international politics forces states to act primarily in their security interests. Yet
while Mearsheimer claims that the only way for a state to seek security is to maximize its power,
Waltz argues that states ought instead seek a balance of power. In Waltz’s view, maximizing
power may actually decrease security by causing instability and creating incentive for states to
wage preventive war.66 Interstate war is rarely rational, especially costly great power war, so the
expected outcomes of a unit change in the system, such as the rise of China, would not
necessarily lead to tragic outcomes.
Nevertheless, Waltz recognizes that wars have happened, and that many international
political decisions simply cannot be explained by his theory. He is left claiming that structural
realism can only explain the results of international politics, not why decisions were made. Waltz
argues that a theory of foreign policy is necessary to explain why or why not states make
decisions consistent with realist logic, since apparently they often make irrational decisions.67
This inability to explain foreign policy decisions hamstrings Waltz’s ability to make predictions
since outcomes are contingent on policy choices exogenous to the theory.68 Some theories
reviewed later in this section attempt to add an explanation of foreign policy choices (domestic
politics), but Waltz’s theory alone is not truly predictive.
Waltz’s realism can nevertheless analyze balances of power as more or less stable, and
therefore determine if conflict is more or less likely to occur. Although this is not predictive per
se, since it does not claim that any particular outcome will occur, it does allow for some
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expectations given a particular balance of power. Applying this sort of analysis to China,
Waltz’s position gives several reasons to be pessimistic, although perhaps less pessimistic than
Mearsheimer.
First, U.S. dominance results in an imbalance of power globally and in East Asia,
creating instability. Other states wish to resist U.S. power to ensure their security, and will
therefore pursue power maximization policies that could possibly lead to conflict.69 Likewise,
the lack of an effective balance against the U.S. means that the U.S. is relatively free to pursue
aggressive policies threatening the security of other states, although this effect may be more
notable with threatened minor and middle powers like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North
Korea.
Second, the U.S. appears to be set on its desire to remain the premier power, meaning that
the U.S. will be unlikely to allow a balance of power with China as a peer competitor or the
premier power. Strictly speaking this is not analysis endogenous to Waltz’s structural realism,
but an assessment that the U.S. will fail to follow structural realism’s prescriptions, damaging its
security. Waltz argues that U.S. foreign policy choices since the Cold War have not followed
balance of power logic, and that existing liberal values and interest in American preponderance
leave the impression that the U.S. is unlikely to change its foreign policy to bring it in line with
balance of power logic.70
Third, even if the U.S. decided to pursue a foreign policy more consistent with the
balance of power, Waltz argues that the balance of power in East Asia is necessarily unstable
because it is multipolar. Waltz recognizes that although proper balancing coalitions should form
69
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regardless of the distribution of power, a multipolar distribution of power is more associated with
failures of proper coalition formation. Multipolarity is more complex than a bipolar balance of
power, so the possibility for miscalculation is higher.71 Moreover, just as in any collective action
problem, states may find an incentive to cheat a balancing coalition, leading to an imbalance of
power.72 The distribution of power in East Asia fits the characteristics of multipolarity because
states like Japan and Russia (and arguably several other states) could decisively change the
balance of power. The danger of this multipolarity is enhanced by territorial disputes between
several of the major regional powers, including the Korean conflict, the Taiwan issue, and the
dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaouyu Islands.73 In structural realist
terms, this would mean that states in the region overlap in their definitions of the domain of their
security (their territory), meaning that there is necessary insecurity in the region that cannot be
overcome by the balance of power. For example, regardless of the balance of power, the PRC
will always view the existence of the ROC on Taiwan as a threat to its security because the
relevant territory that China is supposed to secure includes Taiwan.
Fourth, even if a balance of power were to form between great powers, the effects of
balancing would still likely be somewhat “tragic.” Great power rivalry would likely lead to
suboptimal outcomes similar to those of the Cold War, including arms races, lost economic
activity, and a general lack of cooperation on important global issues like climate change. For
example, the failure of the Copenhagen climate change conference resulted primarily from a
disagreement between the U.S. and China.74 Although it cannot be definitively proved that the
disagreement was a result of power rivalry, it may be an indication of a pattern of rivalry to
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come. Furthermore, while a balance of power can better ensure the security of great powers,
lesser powers often suffer greatly to maintain the balance. For example, while the
Kissinger/Nixon détente may have resulted in a more stable balance of power between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union, the people of Chile, Cambodia, Angola, and East Timor suffered greatly.
Nevertheless, Waltz’s structural realism does not exude the fatalism of offensive realism,
since it maintains the possibility that a proper balance of power will be formed, and significant
competition and great power war will not result. Waltz, like Mearsheimer, also contends that the
U.S. should end its costly military presence in Europe and East Asia, and require Japan and
South Korea to provide for their own security, at least in the short-term.75 However Waltz’s
positions would maintain the possibility for a new, stable balance of power in East Asia, possibly
with a coalition led by Japan balancing a rising China. In any case, this would be better than the
U.S. preventing proper balance formation when it lacks the long-term resources to ensure
stability in East Asia. Moreover, Waltz does not seem to agree with Mearsheimer’s prescription
of trying to undermine China’s rise. Such a policy would likely enhance the security dilemma,
creating greater instability. Instead of worrying about relative power, American foreign policy
ought to focus on creating an appropriate balance of power.
While Waltz’s more defensive realism is an attractive alternative to offensive realism,
Mearsheimer argues that it is not a rational means of prediction and policymaking. He argues
that Waltz’s inability to explain the origins of conflict reduces not only the utility of Waltz’s
theory, since it cannot make predictions or explain the past, but also the theory’s accuracy, since
it misunderstands the systemic pressure on security needs. Given that balances often fail,
uncertainty about future balance formation and the distribution of power drives states to
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maximize their power in order to maximize their security. Waltz’s approach may be interesting
as a “normative theory” in that it describes how the world would work if all states could
accurately assess each other’s power and intentions, but it is not useful for describing or acting in
the real world. China will be expected to maximize its power instead of creating a stable balance
of power, and other potential rivals will also maximize their power instead of counting on a
balancing coalition. A coming conflict is much more likely than Waltz is willing to
acknowledge. 76
Mearsheimer’s criticism identifies some notable gaps in Waltz’s theory, but his solutions
are controversial. While there are many differences between offensive realism and other
contemporary realisms more in line with that of Waltz, there are two main areas of controversy I
wish to highlight because of their pertinence to the rise of China. The first is the extent to which
power equates with security, where defensive realists argue that power maximization is not
always the optimal strategy. The second is the extent to which the international structure
determines state behavior, where neoclassical realists argue that other variables such as
perception and motive must be considered.

Power as security?
Even Mearsheimer does not consider relative power to be the sole determinate of a state’s
security. He acknowledges the importance of geography when explaining the stopping power of
water, where water limits the ability of states to operate necessary ground troops.77 More
generally, this recognizes that power is geographically contingent, since the power of a state
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depends on the location of power’s exercise. This recognition is not exactly groundbreaking, but
Mearsheimer does not go far enough in considering geography’s effects. Simply put, if water is
so effective a stopping power, why should the U.S. be concerned with the rise of China? There
have been no significant attacks on the U.S. homeland by non-regional powers since the War of
1812,78 so why should the rise of China be seen as a threat? One possible explanation is that a
state’s concerns extend beyond security (particularly structural realism’s strict definition of
security as state survival), and this is considered in the next section. Within this consideration of
security, Mearsheimer offers two possible explanations.
The first possible reason Mearsheimer provides for the U.S. to expect conflict with China
is because it is part of American character to use offshore balancing to prevent the rise of a peer
competitor. Mearsheimer repeatedly claims that Americans will not tolerate a peer competitor,
so the U.S. will always intervene in the conflicts of other regions to prevent the rise of a
hegemon.79 The belief that this will happen again with the rise of China is echoed in
Mearsheimer’s prescription that the U.S. should decide whether to abandon or fortify its East
Asian military presence based on China’s potential for regional hegemony.80 If China’s rise puts
it on track to become a regional hegemon, and the U.S. is determined to prevent Chinese
hegemony in East Asia through offshore balancing, then China’s rise ought to elicit fear in the
U.S. because the U.S. and China will likely engage in war or at least intense competition.
Mearsheimer’s claims about the characteristic American demand for primacy might have been
meant as only a narrative element, with survival through power maximization as outlined above
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being the real reason for American offshore balancing. If Mearsheimer is arguing that American
primacy will always be a requirement of American foreign policy (some element of American
exceptionalism), then Mearsheimer is contradicting his own theory by using a reductionist
explanation for foreign policy behavior. Conflict in this case would only be a product of
domestic factors (belief in American exceptionalism), not structural factors. Moreover, it opens
the possibility that policymakers could simply pursue a policy other than primacy, therefore
avoiding conflict.
The second (and more substantive) explanation is a reiteration of the importance of
relative power for the purposes of security. Mearsheimer argues that states can never be
completely secure until they become a global hegemon, which is practically impossible, so states
will always have to be concerned with the rise of other great powers. A state’s ability to project
power outside of its region will be seriously hampered until it becomes a regional hegemon, so
the goal of hegemons in other regions is to prevent the rise of another regional hegemon, which
would become a peer competitor. If China were to become a regional hegemon in Asia, it would
be able to project power to the Western Hemisphere, endangering the United States. The
problem is that it is not at all clear how such a scenario would play out.
Would China itself threaten to conquer the U.S. or overthrow the U.S. government?
Even making the enormous assumption that China would want to do such a thing, it would take
an astronomical power imbalance to allow it to overcome the stopping power of water. Although
he does not state it explicitly, perhaps Mearsheimer believes that technological innovation may
reduce the importance of geography. Mearsheimer continually emphasizes the importance of
preparing for worst-case scenarios, so the possibility of future technological development could
remove the geographical advantage of the U.S. Certainly technology has greatly increased
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projection power over the last several centuries, but it is hard to conceive of a technology that
would allow China to overcome the geographic limitations. Power that can be projected, such as
naval power, air power, nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, and economic power are all ineffective
at controlling territory. And as the “surges” in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, even the
most high-tech military in the world still requires adequate deployment of ground troops.
Would China help build up Mexico or some other regional rival to threaten U.S.
territory? Perhaps it is possible that other regional states such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina
could exercise more power outside of the control of the U.S., curtailing American regional
hegemony. Hugo Chavez’s attempt at creating a “Bolivarian” alliance against the U.S. could be
seen as one such challenge, but the limited extent of its regional spread and its uncertain future
do not seem to bode well for this sort of scenario. Venezuela was unable to convince any
regional power greater than itself to align against the U.S., with Argentina and Brazil
uncomfortable with Venezuelan leadership. Chinese support was notably absent as well, despite
Chavez’s calls for greater political support at resisting “imperialism.” China was unwilling to
sacrifice its relations with the U.S. for strengthening potential regional enemies.81 Of course the
lack of Chinese support could be the product of China’s relative power deficit at the moment,
and there may be greater support for regional challengers after China has become more powerful.
But even with the fervent support of a powerful China and several decades of development, it is
still basically inconceivable that any of these regional states could pose an existential threat to
the U.S. Consequently, the view of China as a threat requires one to assume a worst case
scenario that is nearly impossible to imagine. There would have to be some enormous shift in
the balance of power or some completely surprising technological development. Yet these
81

William Ratliff, “Beijing’s Pragmatism meets Hugo Chavez,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 12, no. 2
(Winter/Spring 2006).

39

possibilities are so remote and unpredictable that power maximization is actually indeterminately
useful at meeting these challenges. For example, power maximization for centuries meant
colonialism, but by the mid-20th Century, colonies provided no benefit in terms of power and
may have even been a hindrance.
These problems of geography and technology are part of a greater realist debate about the
effect of the offense-defense balance, a debate in which offensive realism take the position that
the offense-defense balance has little effect on the nature of international politics. Proponents of
the importance of the offense-defense balance argue that power can only be understood in terms
of what it can accomplish, so considering the relative balance of offensive and defensive
capabilities is necessary to assess security.82 To some extent, Mearsheimer concedes the
importance of the offense-defense balance by recognizing the stopping power of water and the
defensive nature of nuclear weapons.83 The latter is particularly important because very little of
Mearsheimer’s evidence comes from the nuclear era, so offensive realism may be obsolete in
modern international politics.
But while Mearsheimer recognizes the uncertain applicability of his evidence, he
contends that the apparently defensive nature of contemporary IR does not change expected
outcomes because it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive abilities. For
example, missile defense technologies can be used defensively to intercept an enemy’s attacking
missiles, or they can be used offensively to allow a country to attack without fear of a retaliatory
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missile strike. Consequently, the offensive-defense balance is not a meaningful addition to
balance of power theory.84
The controversy over offense-defense balance is extensive and highly technical,
including additional criticisms of the ability to calculate the balance, the degree to which the
balance changes over time, and how relevant the balance is to explaining the behavior of states.85
While the entirety of the debate is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that Charles
Glaser offers a powerful defensive realist critique of Mearsheimer’s position on the debate.
Glaser argues that distinguishing between the offensive and defensive capabilities of any
particular weapon or tactic is not important, especially because the offense-defense balance of
any weapon or tactic can vary depending on other contextual factors. Instead, all that is required
is that one be able to assess the probability of success in an offensive mission and the probability
of success in a defensive mission against an attacking opponent. While such an assessment
could be complicated, military strategists do this all the time when they make military net
assessments.86 Acknowledging the possibility that offensive capabilities will be inferior to
defensive capabilities is cause for greater optimism in the case of future Sino-American relations.
The offense-defense variable could result in little ability for either side to pose a threat to the
other, ensuring security and reducing the need for competition. Even though the possibility of a
future change in the offense-defense variable could lead to a greater likelihood of conflict,87 both
sides can pursue strategies that focus on defensive capabilities and increase transparency to
reduce the risk of miscalculation.
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Ultimately, equating power and security ignores too much. Considerations of the
offense-defense balance (both in terms of weapons and geographic constraints) are necessary for
good analysis. They allow for more detailed explanation by accounting for relevant factors that
the most barebones of structural realisms (Waltz’s and Mearsheimer’s) reject, and they can allow
for more correct analysis by taking these relevant factors into consideration. This has an
enormous impact on policy because it empowers policymakers to use their knowledge to pursue
policies that result in less intense competition. In the end, these policies possibly avoid the
“tragic” outcomes of offensive realism.

International structure determines state behavior?
The assumption thus far has been that international politics can be analyzed through a
strictly “third-image” perspective, with only material factors determining international behavior.
More specifically, the agreement is that the independent variable is the international structure,
which demands that states seek security if they are to survive, and the disagreement is on the
importance of possible intervening material variables like geography and offense-defense
balance of military capabilities. Yet these variables still cannot adequately explain foreign
policy behavior, such as why states start wars that they ultimately lose, or why certain states
seem to pursue conquest not only for the sake of security. To these problems, further realist
scholarship adds that the human elements need to be reincorporated into understandings of
international politics. While material factors may determine outcomes, decisions are made by
people with ideas, so ideas must play an important role in IR. Strictly speaking, this is not
inconsistent with Waltz’s structural realism in that Waltz agrees that he cannot explain foreign
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policy decisions, yet it does contradict offensive realism and some materialist defensive realist
approaches since these contend that materialism alone can be understood to determine the
behavior of states.
The inclusion of ideational as well as material variables is similar to classical realism,
which gives these theories the label “neoclassical” realism. Carr and Morgenthau included
considerations of human nature and the character of individual states, such as Morgenthau
observing the “undogmatic common sense of the British.”88 Contemporary theorists are more
sensitive to such broad and timeless generalizations, but the gist of these variables remains. The
distinction between classical and neoclassical realists is that the latter retain the structural
conditions posited by Waltz, arguing that structure exerts an influence on foreign policy
behavior.
However, the relationship between ideational variables and structural/materialist
variables is contested. One possibility is to posit that non-material variables are additional
independent variables. Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” theory is a prominent example of
this type. Responding to Waltz, Walt argues that states do not make policy decisions on
straightforward calculations of relative power. As Walt puts it, “Although power is an important
part of the equation, it is not the only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with
or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat.”89 Balance of threat therefore adds that
aggressive intention joins aggregate power, geographic proximity, and offensive power (offensedefense balance) as independent variables.90 Because the foreign policy of a state is based on a
multivariable calculation, it is impossible to predict “which sources of threat will be the most
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important in any given case.”91 For example, faced with a power with aggressive intentions but
little aggregate power, different decision-makers may assess the threat differently and create
different policies in response.
Walt’s analysis does add seemingly important considerations with the inclusion of the
aggressive intention variable, but it differs from most neoclassical theories in two important
ways. First, Walt still assumes that states are always security-seeking, which means that he
cannot always explain where aggressive intentions would come from. Most neoclassical realists
argue that states can have different motives, although constrained by the international structure,
including aggressive motives. Second, Walt’s separation of perceived aggressive intention from
other variables precludes analyses in which these variables are related. Consequently,
neoclassical realists usually argue that the international structure is still the only independent
variable, and ideational variables are intervening variables.92 This provides the ability to explain
that ideational variables are contingent on the reality within which they exist, that reality being
the international structure.93
The possibility of non-material intervening variables is not new, and certainly pre-dates
the label “neoclassical realism.”94 Robert Jervis, for example, famously argued that perception is
a vital intervening variable.95 Perhaps what is distinctive of neoclassical realism is recognition
of the possibility of many different ideational intervening variables and a reaffirmation of their
importance.96 Of course, the plethora (and complexity) of ideational variables is extremely
91
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reductionist, as any event can be explained by several different variables in several different
ways.97 Yet these variables are still important, since they allow for analysis that can be much
more nuanced and contextually useful than simple materialist explanations. I focus here on the
variable of a state’s motive, which largely determines a state’s “grand strategy.”
Motive is similar to intention in Walt’s threat calculation, since a state with aggressive
motives will likely display more threatening intention. Conversely, states only motivated by
security might display less threatening intention.98 Yet motives and intentions are different.
Motives refer to the ultimate goal of a state’s policy, its while intentions refer to the way in
which states plan to achieve these goals in relation to the international environment. Similar
intentions can be shared by states with different motives. For example, a state can display
aggressive intention toward another state (attack or plans of doing so) either because it believes
that an attack will enhance its security (security motive) or because it believes that an attack will
satisfy its greediness. Glaser points out that many scholars use motive and intention
interchangeably, so claims under the term “intention” should be assessed on their content, not
their terminology (such as Mearsheimer’s use of intention with respect to China’s motives).99
Moreover, motives are characterized in many different ways, from Glaser’s simple dichotomy of
security-seeking or greedy,100 to Schweller’s variety of combinations of power and motive in
animal form,101 to more common terms such as “revisionist” or “status-quo.” I use some of these
terms interchangeably, and I do not think that it is important for the purposes of this paper to take
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a position on the possible categories of state motivation. All that I claim is that states may
strictly seek their security, or they may seek goals beyond their immediate security needs. These
latter goals are still relevant to security studies inasmuch as they have an impact on the security
of other states, such as in cases of aggressive conquest of another, or for the aggressive state
itself if security is ultimately sacrificed for an aggressive goal.
Understanding motives would seem to be important in the case of a rising power, but
Mearsheimer is quite clear in his reasoning for why motives cannot be used as a variable. First,
assessing motives is difficult, especially because leaders often lie.102 Second, even if motives
can be discerned in the present, it is indeterminate in the future.103 Threat assessments, therefore,
cannot rely on motivational information to form a proper balance. Uncertainty of motives means
that states should prepare for the worst. There are, however, two main reasons to think motives
are worth assessing.
First, motives can be known. Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives
can be difficult, but this does not mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of
finding out information about the goals of states and the means with which they plan to achieve
them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state
interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The possibility that information
may be flawed should not lead to a rejection of all information. People make decisions based on
less than perfect knowledge all of the time. This ability to know motives extends to future
motives, because an analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe
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consistencies or constant evolutions of motives. Prediction of the future is necessarily less
certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made.104
Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to
assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the
security dilemma, which could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic,
but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security
situation were the United States to withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it
would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide
a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear European powers to wage a preemptive war
against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent.105 This scenario is not
rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that other states will attack
if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear
weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a
deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that
the security dilemma exists because of a lack of motivational knowledge, so the proper response
is to try to enhance understanding of motives, not discard motivational knowledge altogether.
Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but reducing misperception would
allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in preferable outcomes
relative to offensive realism.106
Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China, because mutually preferable
outcomes can be achieved if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have
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to assume, but is actually a status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of
the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that
China is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more
intentional information than what is publicly known. At the very least, valuing motivational
assessments empowers policymakers to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the
possibility of reducing competition and conflict.
Nevertheless, there is reason to think that China is not completely aggressive. Taiwan
has the most reason to worry about aggression because the PRC clearly does intend to govern
Taiwan at some point in the future, and PRC military buildup has focused on capabilities that can
be used to conquer Taiwan and limit American access to the island.107 Nevertheless, Beijing has
continually reasserted that unification ought to happen through peaceful means, and has
displayed patience in achieving its goal.108 The problem from an American policymaking
standpoint is that if motivational knowledge is ignored, then the PRC’s potential belligerence
against Taiwan is then framed in the larger context of an aggressive rising power requiring some
sort of greater containment strategy. Yet save for the island disputes, Chinese goals for Taiwan
do not seem to reflect consistent Chinese intention for conquest. This observation is consistent
with constant Chinese assertions of “sovereignty” as the primary value in international politics,
which would seem to be completely antithetical to aggression outside of the bounds of claimed
territory (such as Taiwan).109 The better and more nuanced understanding, therefore,
characterizes China as an aggressive, “greedy” state but its greed is limited to only Taiwan. It is
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otherwise a security-seeking power. From a standpoint of American security, defending Taiwan
is not in the vital national interest because Chinese intentions for Taiwan would not extend to
Chinese intentions for the United States once China becomes more powerful. Moreover, it may
be rational for a state to concede the demands of a “limited-aims greedy state,” since the
concession would reduce the security competition that could lead to a wider conflict inherent in
trying to contain the greedy state’s aims.110
Moreover, if China were to be considered an aggressive state, one would expect to find
most states in the region responding to China’s rise by taking additional measures to ensure their
own security, but this is not incontrovertibly occurring. Because the U.S. commitment to the
region has not increased in terms of troops or spending, the expectation is that states would have
less faith in the assurance of buck-passing strategies and would be balancing either internally
(which in this case would be power-maximization) or externally. Such competition can possibly
be observed with Japan, which, for example, recently redirected their defense forces against a
Chinese threat instead of a Russian one.111 The Japanese situation can be explained by the
territorial dispute between China and Japan, especially since there have recently been several
high-profile incidents involving the islands. Until the dispute is resolved, there will inevitably be
at least a low-level of competition between China and Japan over the islands. But there is no
reason why this competition should necessarily escalate since neither state has yet made a serious
attempt to change the status quo.112 Additionally, Japan and most other East Asian states seem to
experience little fear from the rise of China that has resulted in ambivalent or bandwagoning
behavior, contrary to expectations of realism without a motivational variable. For example,
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David Kang finds that in South Korea, policymakers basically agree that China has no intention
of aggression, and that therefore the rise of China ought not be regarded as a security issue. And
Vietnam, a country that experienced conflict with China in the last forty years and is not within
the U.S. alliance structure, resolved its contentious border dispute with China and cut its defense
spending while increasing military cooperation with China.113 An alternative explanation is that
these states are simply misperceiving the threat, causing them to underbalance. This also may be
true, but the point is that these sorts of assessments cannot be made without some sort of
ideational variable, whether it is perception or motivation. And at least policy can try to
minimize misperception. For example, a policy of engagement allows greater access to
motivational information.114
Ultimately, considering ideational variables like intention can drastically increase the
explanatory power of realism and substantively change expectations of state behavior in ways
that can be of great benefit to policymakers. Policymakers do not have to assume that states
desire to be global hegemons, as offensive realism would dictate, but can discover and work with
a distinct state preferences. Of course the strength of offensive realism is also neoclassical
realism’s weakness; offensive realism’s simplicity offers extensive predictive power, and
neoclassical realism does not. Neoclassical realism’s predictive power fails for two principle
reasons. First, the potential for many different variables means that analyses will be more
complicated and possibly indeterminate. Indeterminacy will necessarily occur if there is no
agreement on the set of variables, but even if there is agreement on several variables, their
interaction may also be indeterminate. Second, the content of the variables can be more difficult
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to determine. For example, how policymakers will perceive a certain event depends largely on
the character of the policymakers and their given frameworks for understanding reality. These
variables are basically impossible to quantify, meaning that neoclassical realism has to work
outside of the positivist methodology of material realism and therefore cannot make “clocklike”
predictions in the short- and medium-term. What it can do, however, is emphasize which
variables that are likely to be important, and how these variables generally play out over the
long-term.115 To policymakers, this sort of theory is not only more accurate and detailed than
offensive realism in describing emerging phenomena, but also enables them to work with
relevant variables in shaping foreign policy outcomes. Under neoclassical realism, China’s rise
may be a cause for concern because of the historical record and existing tensions, but the “tragic”
outcome is not inevitable. There are good reasons to believe that China’s economic development
will not translate into aggression because China’s foreign policy aims are limited.116 Yet the
future can depend on U.S. foreign policy choices, and poor policy choices will nonetheless lead
to the tragedy predicted by Mearsheimer.

Liberalism
The label of “liberalism” encompasses a wide array of different theoretical positions that
share more in goals than in substance. It includes the almost purely normative positions of
idealists, the structural and rationalist concerns of neoliberals, and the social awareness of more
constructivist positions. In substance, many of these positions are contradictory, or at least
address distinct phenomena. Yet they all share a belief in the possibility of progression toward
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normatively preferable outcomes. If realists follow Thucydides in claiming that international
politics will always be viscously competitive, then liberals follow Kant in claiming that the
power of reason can lead to progress in international politics. The defining difference between
realists and liberals, therefore, is that liberals reject the zero-sum character posited by realism,
instead contending that absolute gains are possible.117
This section addresses the relevance of liberal theoretical positions to policymaking in
response to the rise of China. Specifically, I focus on more rationalist theoretical positions
generally grouped under “neoliberalism.” These positions posit that relevant actors have
determinate interests that they rationally seek to maximize, and that various processes will allow
actors to cooperate and seek absolute gains.118 This obvious similarity to neorealism means that
neoliberalism shares many of the advantages and problems with neorealism, and the two
positions can be criticized as one from an alternative epistemological or ontological position.119
Yet neorealism and neoliberalism differ substantially in expected outcomes and policy
prescriptions, so a separate assessment is necessary. The two liberal phenomena examined here
are international institutions and economic interdependence. Constructivist positions considered
later in this chapter provide alternative explanations for these phenomena.
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International Institutions
Liberals also argue that international institutions can reduce the negative effects of
competition and allow states to achieve absolute gains. Generally speaking, institutions are
social elements that are at least somewhat permanent. While recognizing that there are other
things that are considered institutions, Robert Keohane narrows the definition to “institutions that
can be identified as related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time.”
Examples in international behavior include international organizations like the United Nations,
treaties, and unwritten expectations of behavior. Institutions are stronger or weaker depending
on how strongly and consistently they shape the behavior of actors.
From a rationalist perspective, institutions facilitate rational, materially driven actors in
achieving their goals. More specifically, institutions reduce transaction costs incurred by actors
by reducing uncertainty through information and clear expectations. Institutions provide
disincentives to defect from an agreement with collective punishment or disadvantages in later
iterations of interaction. This strict rational neoliberal institutionalism is similar to rationalist
structural realism (Waltz, et al.), since it makes the same assumptions about the international
structure and the relevant actors, but argues for different possible outcomes. So while actors are
still self-interested and competitive, cooperation is possible with institutions. Although
institutions are social, rationalists limit the social conception of institutions to rational elements
such as information sharing and the formation of expectations based on previous behavior.120 A
limited social conception is also posited by Waltz when he argues that successful states “will
imitate each other and become socialized to their system,” as in following the norms of
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diplomacy.121 A deeper, “sociological” perspective sees institutions as fluid, discursive limits on
identity and practice.122 This perspective is considered in the section on constructivism.
If institutions were highly effective, then there would be little reason to worry about the
rise of China. States could simply create a rule to outlaw war, and no war would occur. Of
course, this has been attempted several times, yet wars still occur. The neoliberal position here is
that wars occur because large transaction costs prevent effective institutions from forming. In
the case of security agreements, punishment for defection is difficult to achieve because the
defector is likely very powerful, and other states will see an incentive to buck-pass and defect
from their enforcement obligation. Strong institutions are only allowed by powerful states
inasmuch as the interests of powerful states are given preference, so the scope of institutions is
also limited by this transaction cost. 123
With this problem, realists argue that the celebration of institutions is misguided.
Mearsheimer delivers the most severe criticism of neoliberalism when he argues that it almost
completely overlooks the importance of relative gains. If a gap in power grows between states,
the weaker state’s security is not ensured because the more powerful state could easily defect
from the security agreement without suffering much punishment from the weaker enforcers.
And although much institutionalism was designed with non-security interactions in mind, it will
usually fail there as well both because many interactions like relative economic capacity
constitute a state’s power (and therefore security), and because states seem to pursue relative
interests in trade policy as well. Of course Mearsheimer does not deny that institutions exist, but
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he claims that existing institutions reflect convergences of power maximization among states
(relative to other states).124
Mearsheimer’s critique assumes his position that absolute competition is always inherent
in security matters. Defensive realists take a position more amenable to neoliberalism on the use
of institutions. In a scenario where relevant states are status quo powers, institutions that
decrease transaction costs associated with balancing can help prevent conflict. Unlike
neoliberals, however, they recognize that the possibility of aggressive states (and therefore
cheating), seriously limits the instances in which institutions are useful. States can bind
themselves to an institution such that they will pay a penalty if they defect, but that penalty is
only as strong as the willingness and ability of other states to enforce it. Institutions do not exert
influence independently.125
Yet given my previous analysis on defensive realism, there is a good possibility that the
East Asian security dynamic is extremely defensively oriented, which would allow for more
cooperation. Ikenberry suggests that China, with the U.S.’s encouragement, should try to bind
its use of force so as to not appear threatening and worsen the security dilemma. This would
follow the model of Germany’s reunification in 1989, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl reduced the
apparent threat of a resurgent Germany by committing itself to European integration. 126 To
some extent, China already seems interested in pursuing this sort of binding by its enormously
increased participation in regional and global institutions. Offensive realism would not predict
that a rising power would bind itself to international institutions where it must conform to rules
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created by the existing powers. For example, Chinese accession to the WTO required substantial
and difficult domestic political and economic changes, and requires compromises in the strict
view of sovereignty favored by Beijing.127 Cooperation on security matters is less prominent,
but China has expressed interest in binding through cooperation with the ASEAN Plus Three and
the East Asian Summit. Yet these existing regional organizations are too weak to constitute a
substantial commitment, so an additional organization is needed. Alliances or true collective
security organizations are probably impossible, but an institutionalized forum to increase
transparency and clarify expectations would be useful.128
Pessimists would respond that China is only maximizing its power given the conditions
created by the U.S. and other regional actors, and that institutions will do little to bind China
once it becomes very powerful. Great power security competition is not a forgotten concern, as
demonstrated by a Chinese Ministry of Defense white paper claiming that “international military
competition remains fierce” in East Asia.129 Moreover, Chinese participation in organizations
like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization indicates possibly malicious and exclusive
intentions.130 Ultimately the evidence is inconclusive, posing a significant policy problem.

Economic Interdependence
While Mearsheimer predicts that the Sino-American rivalry will mimic the SovietAmerican rivalry during the Cold War, the Sino-American economic relationship is a striking
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difference between the two scenarios. In terms of trade partners, the U.S. is China’s largest
trading partner (unless the EU is considered as a whole, then the EU is first), Japan is China’s
third largest trading partner, and Taiwan is China’s seventh largest trading partner.131 From the
U.S. perspective, China is the second largest trading partner after Canada, with China
representing fourteen percent of total U.S. trade in 2009.132 Foreign exchange reserves are also
important in terms of economic interdependence. China has the largest holding of foreign
exchange reserves in the world, almost $2.5 trillion in June 2010.133 Slightly over sixty percent
of the PRC’s foreign exchange reserves are in U.S. dollars, and another sizable portion are in
Japanese Yen. These economic relationships bear little resemblance to the bloc-based system of
trade during the Cold War.
Liberals claim that this difference is hugely important for security because trade mitigates
security concerns. The basic theory is that if states are economically interdependent, then war
will rarely be a rational choice because it would cause enormous economic damage to the
aggressor. A simple version of this claim is consistent with structural realist calculations of
security-seeking states. If aggression in an economically interdependent world will almost
always reduce the aggressor’s power (through economic damage), then aggression will be less
common. Yet there would still be cases where a state would become an aggressor to increase its
relative power at the expense of its absolute power. But positive views of economic
interdependence generally consider state interests to be more than zero-sum security concerns.
Richard Rosecrance, for example, argues that a states “aim to improve their position in world
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politics,” which they can do through “acquisition of new territory” or “economic development
and trade.”134 If conquest becomes a relatively less attractive option because of the limited value
of the territory acquired and the high cost (in spent national resources and lost international
trade) in obtaining it, states will tend toward trade goals.135 Competitive power politics and
security concerns will never be completely obviated since states will still have to ensure a base
level of security, but they will be given a low priority relative to trade.136
China seems to be a good fit for this description of the “trading state.” China’s “rise” is
first and foremost an economic rise. Mearsheimer acknowledges that China’s power is mostly
“latent,” meaning that it will have the capability to create a strong military, but has not yet done
so.137 For example, China’s military spending as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively
low, fluctuating between 1.7 and 2.5 percent between 1989 and 2009.138 Furthermore, while
Mearsheimer, Robert Gilpin, and Paul Kennedy all observe an economic rise as a component of
violent power transitions, virtually all of their historical cases include some element of conquest,
such as Napoleonic France, American Manifest Destiny, the unification of Germany, and Nazi
expansionism.139 While aggressive intent toward Taiwan my indicate that the PRC will
ultimately follow the violent path of these great powers, Beijing’s détente with Taiwan and
emphasis on cross-strait economic relations are indications of a “trading state” foreign policy.140
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Lastly, the PRC leadership has continually stated its belief that economics ought to guide
international relations, and that trade can lead to greater security.141
If trade with China will lead to peace, then there is little reason to worry about China’s
rise. Moreover, the policy prescription is to increase economic interdependence and trade,
contrary to Mearsheimer’s recommendation. Yet there is little consensus on the security effects
of trade. Alternative views hold that economic interdependence has little effect on occurrence of
conflict, increases the likelihood of conflict, or has more nuanced effects depending on the type
of economic relationship. Empirically proving any of these positions is problematic due to
difficulties in establishing causality, difficulties defining economic interdependence and conflict,
and the possibility that contemporary international economic relationships are functionally
different from past relationships.142 This situation is a perfect example of the difficulty of the
use of theory by policymakers, because the anticipated outcomes of economic interdependence
are highly complex and controversial but nevertheless extremely important. Ultimately, SinoAmerican economic interdependence will result in neutral, positive, or negative security
outcomes, and policymakers have to pursue policies that increase interdependence or not, as well
as determine the extent and type of interdependence.143 A full assessment of the debate is
beyond the scope of this paper, but for the sake of comparison to offensive realism, I consider
Mearsheimer’s objections (which are typical of realist objections) to optimism about economic
interdependence and a possible response.
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Mearsheimer’s objection reasserts that states are concerned about relative instead of
absolute gains because of security concerns inherent in international anarchy. States will worry
that interdependence reduces their relative power either because the economic benefits may
accrue unevenly (for example, although the rise of China has arguably helped the U.S. economy
at least in the short term, China has clearly gained relative to the U.S.), or because dependence
will be distributed unevenly such one state will gain a strategic advantage. An example of the
latter phenomenon is increased Chinese reliance on oil imports, which is problematic for China
in a possible Sino-American confrontation, because the U.S. and its allies control key oil
shipping lanes.144 This concern also motivates China’s plans to build a blue water navy to keep
shipping lanes open, fueling the security dilemma.145 Another recent example of where
asymmetric interdependence was exploited was the brief Chinese ban on exporting rare earth
minerals to Japan because of Japan’s arrest of a Chinese fisherman who rammed a Japanese
naval vessel near the Senkaku/Diaoyou Islands. Since Japan relies on rare earth minerals to
manufacture many high-tech goods, and China has a virtual monopoly on rare earth mineral
production, there was little Japan could do other than protest in the short term and try to decrease
their dependence in the long term through an alternative supply chain.146 Economic
interdependence can therefore leads to strategic imbalances, encouraging conflict. Mearsheimer
also claims support for his position on the basis of historical data, notably European economic
interdependence leading up to World War I.147
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A higher level of interdependence in the global economy, however, might mitigate the
problems claimed by Mearsheimer. John Ravenhill argues that recent trade developments limit
the ability of states to use trade strategically. Two particular developments stand out. First, the
enormous growth in currency markets mean that strategic use of trade is more likely to backfire.
China’s holding of U.S. Treasury bonds is a good example of this interdependence. While the
U.S. debt may be problematic in the long run, concerns that China can use T-bonds strategically
are unfounded.148 Any attempt to dump the bonds will plummet their value, destroying the value
of Chinese capital reserves.149
Additionally, transnational production networks reduce the ability of a state to use trade
strategically. While many resources and some goods can be produced as a finished product
within one country, goods are increasingly produced in part by many different countries. For
example, the production of a car involves investment, design, resource acquisition, material
production, parts production, and assembly. In the past, all of these elements would exist in one
or two countries, so a Ford car would be a completely American product. Now the production
network for a car (and many other products) can easily involve a dozen or more countries. This
means that exploiting trade for strategic advantage is much more difficult because countries that
exist within many of the same transnational production networks will suffer larger and more
equal economic loss if they were to go to war. This creates “genuine interdependence, [not]
uneven relationships of asymmetrical vulnerabilities.”150 Mearsheimer’s objections, therefore,
apply to fewer and fewer elements of trade, and his empirical data are less relevant because they
148
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come from a time when these sorts of trade relationships did not exist. Nevertheless, oil and rare
earth minerals are examples of potentially strategic trade items that have at best limited inclusion
in transnational production networks.
Since some trade can be used strategically, economic interdependence is not a panacea.
If policymakers do wish to pursue economic interdependence, they should try to create
relationships with high expectations of future trade instead of relying on existing trade. If a state
expects beneficial and interdependent trade to develop or continue, it will be less willing to
engage in conflict with its trade partner than if prospects of future trade are lower.151 The
importance of expectations adds another dimension to the need for market confidence and
stability. Policymakers ought to try to avoid exploiting trade issues for short-term political gain,
such as in China’s treatment of rare earth mineral exports, and the populist bashing of Chinese
trade policies before the 2010 American elections.152 Of course, a state’s ability to dictate
patterns of international economic activity is limited, but one way that it can promote stable
trading relationships is through international institutions encouraging economic interdependence,
like the WTO.
Economic interdependence and international institutions more broadly are parts of an
eclectic liberal tradition, but they well represent the broader issues associated with rationalist
attempts to provide positive-sum security outcomes. Neoliberals cannot claim that the security
dilemma can be altogether overcome, because they still recognize that mistrust and the potential
for aggression will remain. Additionally, if offensive realism is correct that China will exploit
neoliberal carrots to accelerate its rise without ultimately improving the security dynamic, then
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neoliberal engagement is the exact opposite policy that ought be pursued. But if neoliberals are
right that institutions and trade can prevent otherwise likely conflict, then the failure to engage is
truly tragic. The assessment is complicated by heated controversies over empirical data,
especially since institutions and trade are quantitatively greater and qualitatively different than in
the past. Yet again, policymakers are in the quandary of making important decisions with
contradictory recommendations of indeterminate quality.

Sociological Positions
Despite the highly contentious disagreements between the different theoretical positions
considered thus far, all of them have very similar philosophical underpinnings. They have all
had the same rationalist ontological stance, which identifies international politics as driven by
actors pursuing fixed materialist desires.153 The positions also all claim the same positivist
epistemological view, which claims that subjects are distinct from the “outside world” of
objective reality, and that this reality can be accessed and understood in terms of causal
claims.154 These twin assumptions fundamentally shape our understanding of IR by determining
what international politics is and how we can know about it. For example, a structural realist
understanding of the statement that “states maximize power to ensure security” assumes at least
that “states,” “power,” and “security” are real, static, and objectively knowable things. The
reason for developing theory on these bases is not elusive; rationalism and positivism enable
theorists to make relatively certain claims about reality. Under these conditions, theory is simply
a matter of identifying the proper variables, determining the content of these variables from
153
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objective facts, and calculating outcomes that can then be tested against the real world. These
assumptions are far from trivial, however, because theorizing from different ontological and
epistemological claims result in very different, and possibly more useful understandings of
international politics.
In ontological terms, the primary alternative to rationalism is constructivism, a
sociological view of IR. In short, constructivism posits that the identities and motives of actors
are constructed through a social process, and that they are minimally or not at all materially
determined. Instead of material factors, fluid ideas are what drive international relations. This
insight is important because it opens the possibility of ideational change as a possible solution to
international conflict. For example, neoliberalism struggles to overcome relative power
calculations and the security dilemma, because the international structure gives states certain
fixed interests. But if interests, the structure-agent relationship, and “security” are only ideas,
then ideational change could lead to a less conflictual culture.155 I more fully explain
constructivism and its importance to policymaking in the context of the rise of China after
addressing epistemological dissent from critical theory

Critical Approaches
Criticism also exists for the epistemological basis of mainstream IR theory, positivism,
resulting in provocative theoretical positions. The basic claim of post-positivists is that
mainstream theory claims that knowledge as objective and immutable when all knowledge is
actually subjective and contingent. A theorist cannot have objective knowledge because reality
155
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can only be observed by a subject, the theorist. Knowledge, therefore, is articulated in terms of
inherently subjective discourses.156
Recognizing the subjectivity of mainstream IR’s supposedly objective knowledge leads
to two main conclusions. First, mainstream IR is inaccurate in its understanding of the world, so
awareness of subjectivity will allow for greater explanation and engagement with reality.
Second, mainstream IR knowledge hides the value judgments inherent in subjective claims by
positing their objectivity. This places them beyond question, elevating their power. The
reproduction of dominant IR discourses oppresses the less powerful by marginalizing their
discourses. 157 For example, critical theorists argue that mainstream IR discourse is implicitly
masculinized, excluding women from positions of power and from consideration of the effects of
theory and policy.158 Critical theorists attribute many if not all of negative outcomes in
international politics to exclusive, dominant discourses. War, for example, often results from the
reproduction of dominant discourses of statist power.159 Consequently, the goal of critical theory
is “emancipatory,” a normative attempt to resist power. Resistance is attempted through
exposing subjectivity, promoting the discourses of the oppressed, and otherwise attempting to
change the discursive climate to loosen the grip of dominant discourses.160
While purely critical approaches may be interesting or even more correct, they are
basically useless for policymakers. Robert Cox distinguishes critical theory from problemsolving theory, where the latter does not question dominant discourses and institutions but tries
156
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to get them to “work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.”
Mainstream IR theory fits this description. Critical theory tries to affect the real world as well,
but it tries to enact broad social change instead of focusing on specific problems.161 This will not
do for policymakers, who have to craft responses to specific issues like the rise of China.162 As
Waltz argues in a response to Ashley and Cox, problem-solving theory needs to make
assumptions regardless of their objectivity: “The alternative is simply to eschew such [problemsolving] theories altogether. Would we then know more or less about the social and the natural
worlds?”163
Waltz is correct that problem-solving theory needs to make assumptions, but which
assumptions are preferable is a question resolved by neither Waltz nor his critics. Depending on
one’s assessment of the accuracy of the post-positivist epistemology, it could be a mistake to
completely reject the discursive approach. A broad, determinate, and ahistorical theory like
offensive realism is likely to be particularly ignorant to non-rational political dynamics.164 As an
alternative, constructivism is promising in its ability to combine some sensitivity to non-rational
processes while maintaining enough structure to be useful for policy analysis.165 Although this
necessarily sacrifices some of the progressive value of theory, it is preferable relative to other
problem-solving alternatives.
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Constructivism
Like any grouping of theories in a paradigm, constructivist approaches differ. Alexander
Wendt’s structural/statist theory is probably the most famous, but Nicholas Onuf’s rule-based
approach and Richard Ned Lebow’s human nature version are also prominent.166 Direct
comparisons between various constructivist theories would be exhaustive and not particularly
productive because the theories are so different, but often in a marginal sense. For example,
neorealism, neoliberalism, and neoclassical realism are incredibly similar in structure and
terminology, but differ on a few issues in a way that radically changes expected outcomes. In
contrast, constructivist theories often use different terminology, focus on different elements of
interaction, but do not necessarily contradict. Nevertheless, there are a few areas of
disagreement. The most notable split is between conventional constructivists and critical
constructivists, mimicking the debate between Waltz and Ashley. However, this constructivist
split is much less severe because the difference between the sides is limited.167
Because constructivist approaches are so open, they are applicable to basically every
phenomenon. For example, the security dilemma, a stereotypically realist scenario, can be
explained as the product of the realist (“Hobbesian” in Wendt’s terms) strategic culture instead
of material interests.168 This flexibility can be useful, but much of the excitement about
constructivism has been the potential for it to add explanation or even produce outcomes
preferable to those allowed by rationalist models. In particular, constructivists look at the
possibility of ideational elements to overcome apparent materialist barriers. The ominous realist
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predictions of a rising China have been the prefect targets for more optimistic constructivism.
For the sake of comparison, I briefly consider possible constructivist explanations to
international institutions and economic interdependence, indicating how a social explanation
offers a possible means of overcoming realist constrains.
With international institutions, realism allows only instances in which institutions are
compatible with the relative power interests of participating states. Although neoliberalism
hopes that states will pursue absolute gains, it has a hard time explaining how states can forgo
relative power calculations. Moreover, even in cases where states attempt to cooperate through
binding commitments, the assurance is weak. This is especially true in East Asia, where
institutions have relatively little codified binding ability. Amitav Acharya notes that no Asian
institutions have “OSCE-like constraining measures,” and that even perhaps the most successful
regional organization, ASEAN, is highly decentralized. Yet despite the absence of binding
behavior, regional security organizations seem to be making at least some progress in forging a
regional security identity and regularizing behavior of the actors.169 Similarly, in an extensive
empirical analysis of the security policy choices of Chinese leaders in international institutions
between 1980 and 2000, Alastair Iain Johnston finds that policy choices cannot be explained as
realpolitik, despite the leaders’ backgrounds in a realpolitik strategic culture. Instead, he finds
that participation in institutions likely socialized the leaders to adopt the less realpolitik values of
the institutions.170
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Similarly, constructivists believe that international trade has the ability to socialize actors,
achieving security goals beyond simple changes in rational cost/benefit analyses of aggression.
Ming Wan notes that most East Asian states began to trade internationally for realist reasons, but
the practice of trade shifted state identity. Now most East Asian states articulate their national
goals in terms of trade and economic development. Security competition has not vanished, but
the development of shared identities and values has allowed security to be relegated to a secondtier interest under economic development.171
Constructivism offers great promise to guide cooperative outcomes, but its limits must be
known. Much of the evidence proclaiming changes in values is questionably meaningful, so the
extent to which institutions and trade can positively shape values is unclear. The temptation of
constructivism is to think that because interactions are non-material, changing them is easy.
Many social constructions are deeply engrained, and policymakers have limited tools at their
disposal to shape identities.172 Nevertheless, the potential for positive outcomes requires that
policymakers take constructivism seriously.
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Chapter V: Conclusion: Theory and Policy

This brief overview of some of the different theoretical positions applied to the rise of
China should give an idea of the quandary of the policymaker. The debates between different
theoretical positions are complex and obscure, but the differences in prescribed policy can be
enormous. For example, should the U.S. pursue economically independent trade policies with
China? Isolating all other competing theoretical factors, the decision can come down to
technical methodological agreements. A policymaker has to make a choice, and she has little
way of knowing which choice is correct. And the problem is all the more serious when theorists
claim that the wrong choice could lead to great power war.
One possible option is to choose a theory and stick with it. This would make analysis and
decisions straightforward. Additionally, it would establish predictability in policy behavior,
reducing security concerns stemming from uncertainty. But there are two major drawbacks.
First, the theory could be wrong. Dogmatically pursuing an incorrect theory would be much
more disastrous than tentatively wavering between different theories. Second, some theories do
not apply to every aspect of a relationship, creating indeterminate decisions.
Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to solve this problem is Peter J. Katzenstein’s case
for “analytical eclecticism.”173 Analytical eclecticism attempts to abandon the deep theoretical
backing behind different theoretical positions, and combine relevant elements of implemented
173
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theory in “explanatory sketches.”174 The benefit of the approach is that is allows flexible access
to a large amount of relevant knowledge without having to take sides in the theoretical debates.
Analytical eclecticism could be the best option, but there are four potential problems. First, it
assumes complementary theoretical combinations, but the real problems are when different
theories are contradictory.175 Promoting deep economic interdependence is either a good idea or
a terrible one, and combining realist and liberal understandings on trade is probably impossible.
Second, it artificially elevates constructivism because constructivism’s greater compatibility with
other theories. Third, it discounts theories that make few contextual claims. In particular,
offensive realism’s long-term forecast of conflict between China and the U.S. will not
necessarily manifest itself with any signs at this stage. Consequently, policymakers might be
tempted to ignore its warnings for greater descriptive ability. My point is that this creates a
systemically arbitrary criterion for theory selection, not that offensive realism ought to be
followed. Fourth, it allows policymakers to pick and choose theoretical elements that fit their
personal preference. This could be seen as a good way to empower policymakers, but it is also
arbitrary.
Nevertheless, I think an eclectic approach is the only possibility for scenarios of
contradictory, limited knowledge. However instead of arbitrarily picking and choosing, policies
should be selected based on the policymaker’s assessment of their utility. This assessment
would be made by comparing risks of not following a policy, benefits from following the policy,
and the policymaker’s relative faith in the policy. Consequently, a policymaker would be easily
justified in rejected offensive realism’s policy prescriptions toward China. The relative benefit
from following the policies is uncertain and small, but the cost is certain and large. Under any
174
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consideration except that of the hardened offensive realist, Mearsheimer’s policy prescriptions
for China’s rise are clearly misguided.
Ultimately, the theory-policy gap is impossible to completely bridge. Theory is disputed
and decontextualized, and therefore not amenable to the necessities of policy. Yet theory can
still provide generalized guidance to policymakers, pointing them toward potentially relevant
factors in understanding the international environment. Theory must therefore facilitate policy,
not constrain it. In the case of the rise of China, fatalistic theory is of no help. But theory that
empowers policymakers may suggest solutions to this complex problem.
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